This paper is the first one to document that anticipation of adverse events can trigger runs in mutual funds. Using the event of the 2003 and 2004 litigations filed in the U.S. over market-timing and late-trading practices, we find that runs start as early as six months before litigation announcements. The pre-event runs are about half the size of runs that follow announcements, which is about 1% of total assets per month. In addition, investors who run before litigation announcements earn significantly higher risk-and peer-adjusted returns than those who run after because, as the return data on fund holdings show, the former avoid fire-sale costs. In funds holding illiquid assets or funds incurring large outflows, the cumulative differences in abnormal returns can be as high as 6%. Hence, our analysis suggests that a pro-rata ownership design is not sufficient to prevent runs in mutual funds.
Introduction
The first-come-first-served principle governing deposit withdrawals motivates bank runs: every depositor wants to withdraw before others do because those at the back of the line may not recover their deposits (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Chari and Jagannathan, 1988) . In contrast, mutual funds allocate the proceeds from asset sales on a pro-rata basis, a design that should shield mutual funds from runs. Mutual funds, however, may prove susceptible to runs on revelation of adverse information about the quality of management or underlying assets, even though a physical queue of withdrawers, as in bank runs, is absent. This paper provides direct evidence of pre-and post-event runs in the mutual fund industry and the reasons such runs may take place.
We define a fund run as an abnormally concerted redemption of mutual fund shares in anticipation or revelation of an adverse event. The adverse events we focus on are the 2003 and 2004 litigations in the U.S. alleging that certain mutual funds allowed some investors to engage in late trading and market timing, 1 thereby allowing them to enjoy profits at the expense of investors who did not engage in these practices. Upon the suspicion or revelation that fund managers do not serve the interests of all investors equally, disadvantaged investors may discipline the implicated funds by withdrawing existing investments and/or by withholding new investments.
We first document the pre-and post-event runs around litigation announcements.
We find not only that fund runs occur both prior to and post litigation announcement, but 1 Late trading is the purchase or sale of mutual fund shares after determination of the net asset value (NAV) at 4:00 PM. Market timing is the short-term trading of mutual fund shares to exploit price inefficiencies between the mutual fund shares and underlying securities in the funds' portfolios. A representative case of such practices is detailed in the Bank of America Nations Fund Securities Litigation Complaint available at http://securities.stanford.edu/1028/BAC03-01/20030905_f01c_Lin.htm. also that pre-event runs start as early as six months before such announcements. During these six months, flows to implicated funds are 2.28% lower than flows to non-implicated funds and remain lower for at least two years post event. The abnormal outflows from the implicated funds average about 1.42% of TNA per month in the six months following litigations.
We also investigate the motivations for runs other than disciplining management; in particular, the benefits of redeeming shares before the adverse information becomes public (i.e., pre-event runs). The rationale for this focus is as follows. Concerted redemption and the lack of new sales that follow litigation announcements force funds to liquidate assets quickly, and, as Coval and Stafford (2007) show, a large selling volume by institutional investors temporarily depresses underlying asset prices. Because shareholders who redeem shares at this time will suffer losses, investors who can anticipate litigations and the subsequent redemption congestion have incentives to redeem shares before the litigation announcements. By exiting early, informed investors avoid the fire-sale costs caused by subsequent concerted withdrawals. The empirical evidence confirms these hypotheses. We find that investors who run before litigation announcements earn significantly higher risk-and peer-adjusted returns than those who run after. In funds holding illiquid assets, this difference can be as high as 6% accumulated from six months prior to six months post litigation.
To argue that the return difference itself motivates, and thus amplifies, the fund runs in addition to penalizing management, however, we must examine the crosssectional differences in fund vulnerability to run and the difference-in-difference of returns for pre-and post-event withdrawals in litigation events with quite homogenous legal severity. The incentive for early runs will be greater for funds whose return differences due to withdrawal timing are larger either because they hold illiquid assets or because they are likely to suffer larger outflows upon the announcements. Consistent with this implication, we find that funds holding illiquid assets or who are expected to suffer large outflows (e.g., funds with a history of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigations) experience more severe runs both prior to and post litigation announcements. The return difference between investors who run before litigation announcements and those who run after is also more pronounced for these types of funds than for their counterparts. Finally, we verify the implicit assumption of the argument by showing empirically that the return difference between early and late redemptions is indeed driven by fire-sale costs: the event returns of firms held by implicated funds are negative and significant.
Our results thus indicate that mutual fund investors who anticipate negative flows motivated by such adverse events as litigation have incentives to withdraw early and avoid fire-sale costs. The existence of motivation for early withdrawal has an important implication for fund industry stability. When the timing of the action (runs) matters for payoff (returns), strategic complementarities come into play that can amplify the impact of adverse events on fundamentals and generate financial fragility. Nonetheless, mutual fund runs may not occur unless there is a systematic liquidity shock to all fund investors, like those assumed in Chen et al. (2010) 's model. In the absence of such a shock, other investors will purchase the assets at fire-sale prices and may thus correct the mispricing (Chen et al., 2008). 2 This financial fragility of the mutual fund industry is underscored by the U.S.
Treasury's decision to insure the holdings of eligible money-market mutual funds in the wake of the turmoil caused by the run on the Reserve Primary Fund in September 2008.
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Our findings explain exactly why the demise of Lehman Brothers can lead to such fragility. The Reserve Primary Fund held debt securities from Lehman Brothers, whose redemption following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy totaled about two-thirds of its total net assets (Wall Street Journal, 2008; New York Times, 2008) . Because of the simultaneous liquidity crunch in the short-term credit market, to satisfy such redemptions, non-redeeming investors would have had to bear the fire-sale costs associated with asset sales.
As the first academic paper that documents an actual mutual fund run and numerates incentive for mutual fund runs in anticipating of adverse information, our paper therefore makes an important contribution to the mutual fund run literature, which at present consists of only few papers. Among these (and most likely the only one), Chen et al. (2010) , using a global capital allocation model, theoretically argue that strategic complementarities exist in mutual funds because of the costs that withdrawals impose on investors who stay with the funds. The empirical evidence in their paper, however, limits 2 Chen et al. (2010) show that hedge funds that purchase funds' underlying assets at the depressed price during fire-sale periods generate arbitrage profits similar to the profits of the short sellers. However, short selling is not allowed in most mutual funds. 3 The Treasury thus expressed its concerns about the ensuing uncertainty in the mutual fund industry and justified its instatement of a guarantee program as follows: "…Maintaining confidence in the money market fund industry is critical to protecting the integrity and stability of the global financial system. …This action should enhance market confidence and alleviate investors' concerns about the ability for money market mutual funds to absorb a loss…" (U.S. Treasury Department press release, 19 September, 2008) .
to an indirect test of the model by showing the cross-sectional differences in the fund flow performance relation. Our paper not only provides direct evidence of fund runs but also, by focusing on an unambiguously important event in which withdrawals were a major issue for the industry, analyzes the return differences resulting from fire-sale costs for concerted outflows to investors withdrawing pre and post event. These return differences between differently timed withdrawals give the most direct evidence for why strategic complementarity may also play a role in mutual funds.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 develops the methodology, Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 outlines the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes the discussion.
Research method
The argument developed in the introduction can be formulated into four specific empirical problems: whether informed investors run implicated funds prior to and post litigation announcements, whether investors who run funds prior to litigations realize higher returns than those who run post, whether some types of funds are more susceptible to pre-event runs, and whether the low returns on post-litigation withdrawals are indeed caused by fire-sale costs.
Detecting pre-event runs
To document pre-event runs, we need benchmarks of normal flow, the first of which are flows to peers not named in the 2003 and 2004 lawsuits. For this benchmark, we construct three groups of funds: funds whose management companies are not involved in these litigations (funds in non-implicated families), funds not named in the suits but whose management companies are named (non-implicated funds in implicated families), and funds named in the suits (implicated funds). We then compute the fund flows as follows:
where Flow i,t is net flows of fund i in month t, TNA i,t-1 and TNA i,t are total net assets of fund i in month t-1and t, respectively, and r i,t is the return of fund i in month t. To detect whether implicated funds have lower flows than non-implicated funds, we compare the net flows of the three groups around the litigation dates.
The second benchmark for normal flows is the estimated net flows from a model designed to capture the main determinants of fund flows. Because past returns predict future flows (Gruber, 1996; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Zheng, 2000; Tkac, 2001, 2002) 
where fund characteristics are size, the log of TNA; age, the log of days since the first We adopt the style classification of Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) and Ferson and Qian (2005) , which contains the following eight categories: aggressive growth, growthincome, global equity, other equity, bond funds, municipal funds, money market, and other. The event-window indicator (n month) equals 1 if it is the nth month from the date of the litigation filing and 0 otherwise (n = -1, -2…12, 0, 1, 2…12).
Rationale for pre-event runs
Despite that proceeds from asset sales are determined by the prices of underlying We examine whether investors who withdraw prior to the revelation of abusive behavior avoid costs using two approaches, the first of which benchmarks normal returns using five portfolio return models and introduces indicators for pre-and post-event months to identify return differences between investors who withdraw pre-and post-litigations. These five return models are the market model (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965) , the market model with lagged market returns (Scholes and William, 1977) , the FamaFrench benchmark model (Fama and French, 1992, 1993) , the Fama-French benchmark model with a fourth factor that captures momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Carhart, 1997) , and the market model with a factor that captures liquidity (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003) :
where r i,t is the excess returns (net of the risk-free rate) of fund i for month t, and r m.t is the excess market return for month t. FF j includes market returns, size (SMB), and value (HML) factors; MOM is the momentum factor; and LIQ is the liquidity factor. The eventwindow indicator (n month) equals 1 if it is the nth month from the date of the litigation filing and 0 otherwise (n = -1, -2…-6, 0, 1, 2…6).
Impact of fund characteristics and liquidity on pre-event runs
Pre-event runs are motivated by suspicions of litigation and anticipation of the liquidation costs that would arise to satisfy post-litigation redemption. Hence, investor decisions to run before confirmation of the adverse event are influenced by their beliefs about or awareness of abusive behavior and by factors that would increase fire-sale costs.
The likelihood that investors become suspicious of funds' abusive behavior may in turn be affected by the fund management's reputation and the investors' ability to collect and process information. We measure fund reputation using ownership structure and a history undergone an SEC investigation in the past eight years, and caters to large institutional investors only; 0 otherwise. We interact the dummy variables for fund and investor characteristics with all the variables in Equation (2).
The economic rationale for pre-event runs is the liquidation cost (price depression) that funds bear when they are forced to sell assets upon revelation of an adverse event. This liquidity cost increases with the illiquidity of underlying assets and with the volume of redemptions. Hence, investors in funds with illiquid assets, such as real estate investment trusts (REITs), international assets, or municipal funds, have stronger incentives to run because the benefits may be greater. We therefore investigate the impact of underlying asset liquidity on run incentives and investor benefits from running early by generating a dummy variable (liquid) for liquid funds. We then categorize funds as liquid or illiquid based on the assets they invest in as defined in the style classification. Whereas liquid funds invest in large-cap stock and treasury bills, illiquid funds invest in small-cap stocks, sector stocks, international equity and bonds, and asset-backed securities. Finally, we interact the liquid dummy with all the variables in Equations (3)- (7).
We conduct these analyses using a two-step fund-by-fund approach and then a panel approach, which, although its pooling of information from all funds is efficient, may suffer from the problem that all fund coefficients must be the same. In the fund-byfund estimation, the first step estimates the flow model and the five return models for each fund using time-series observations only. The control variables for the flow analysis include accumulated returns in the past one, three, and six months, as well as industryand style-level flows. The explanatory variables include two indicators whose coefficients estimate the pre-event runs and runs (from the flow-model estimation), as well as the risk-adjusted returns (from the returns-models estimation) six months pre and post event. The second step compares the estimated silent runs and the risk-adjusted returns in cross section. We investigate differences by fund groupings based on SEC charge history, ownership structure, investor clienteles, liquidity of underlying assets, and the magnitude of outflows in the post-event window. To compute the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), we estimate the market model-which uses the CRSP equally weighted portfolio as the market portfolio-for each firm using daily returns from 282 days to 30 days prior to the litigation announcements. We then aggregate the weekly CARs using estimated daily abnormal returns for the weeks of September 2-4, September 7-11, September 14-18, and announcement dates, and the names of the parent companies. We also use the Stanford clearinghouse database to identify funds within each implicated fund family explicitly For the universe of mutual funds, we rely on the CRSP mutual funds database (from WRDS), which provides monthly observations of funds' total net assets (TNA) and returns (R). We merge our own list of implicated funds with the CRSP universe of funds using ticker symbols to produce a sample in which implicated funds are differentiated from non-implicated funds. We exclude all funds with missing ticker symbols, funds in their incubation period, funds having fewer than 12 months of observations, and funds whose TNA is smaller than 5 million USD. Because we observe outliers in the flows Although the WRDS database provides information on fund characteristics like expense structure (12b-1 fees, rear and front loads), investment style, age (age), and investor type (retail and institutional funds), we identify the funds of large institutions using MorningStar's data on funds' intial buy restriction. We also hand collect data on certain fund characteristics; for example, we use SEC EDGAR filings and firm websites to determine whether the parent company is a conglomerate or an asset management company, and SEC litigation filings to check whether funds have a prior history of SEC charges. To estimate fund performance, we compile monthly data on market returns (r m );
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risk-free rate (r f ); and value (SMB), size (HML), momentum (MOM), and liquidity (LIQ) factors using WRDS's Fama-French, momentum, and liquidity databases; and draw information on mutual funds' quarterly portfolio holdings from its 13-F Institutional
Holdings database. Finally, we compile daily stock and market returns for computing abnormal returns around the event days from CRSP.
Empirical Results
We arrange our findings around the four empirical questions. First, we investigate whether investors run implicated funds both prior to and post litigation announcements and determine whether the size of pre-event runs is statistically and economically significant. Second, we examine whether investors who run prior to litigation announcements earn higher risk-adjusted returns than do investors who run post
announcements. Third, we analyze how fund and investor characteristics and liquidity of underlying assets may affect the timing and size of runs and the costs to investors who run after the public announcement of litigation, or in a relative sense, the benefits that investors can reap from running early versus late. Finally, using fund holding and stock return data, we empirically assess whether the cost of running late does indeed come from fire-sale costs.
Detecting pre-event runs
We detect pre-event runs using two benchmarks: a univariate analysis to The results in Table 3 confirm that the trends in Figure 1 Table 3 ). The flows of non-implicated funds in implicated families are also significantly lower than the flows of funds in non-implicated families. These results suggest that investors may see involvement in lawsuits as an indicator of fund family managers' failure to serve investor interests. As a result, they punish all funds in implicated families regardless of whether the fund in question allowed abusive practices or not (a spill-over effect). Table 4 provides estimations of the flows model described in Equation (2), which assesses whether implicated funds realize abnormal flows around litigation dates. Here, monthly flows are regressed on four sets of controls-fund characteristics, past returns, fee structures, and aggregate flows-and on indicator variables for event-window months that extend 12 months before and after litigation announcements. 6 Table 4 thus includes six specifications: one that controls for fund characteristics and historic returns; a second and third that introduce controls for fee structure and flow characteristics, respectively;
and three that introduce post-announcement indicators into the first three specifications.
The observation unit is monthly flows from February 1996 to December 2005, and the regressions use cluster-robust variance/covariance estimators in which the clusters are funds.
The results in Table 4 confirm the presence of the runs (pre-event and otherwise) previously indicated in Figure 1 and Table 3. The table shows 
Costs associated with running early versus late
We also investigate whether benefits exist for investors who run implicated funds prior to litigation announcements. Pooling all available data on implicated and nonimplicated funds, we estimate models of normal returns to identify the return differences to implicated funds in the months surrounding litigation announcements. 7 Monthly returns from January 2000 to December 2005 are regressed on risk factors and indicator variables for event-window months as described in Equations (3) through (7). 8 To detect return differences, we also test for differences in the coefficients of the event-window indicators. Here, all regressions use cluster-robust variance-covariance estimators in which the clusters are mutual funds.
7 We employ an alternative approach to detect return differences. We first estimate Equations (3) through (7) for each implicated fund separately and then test whether the coefficients of pre-and post-event months differ. We find that the differences in coefficients are significant in the market model but insignificant in the other models. 8 We estimate Equations (3) through (7) using fund fixed effects. The results are available upon request and remain qualitatively the same.
As Panel A of Table 5 shows, investors who run implicated funds after litigation announcements put up with low returns. Indeed, the estimates from the market model indicate that the cost of exiting implicated funds in the six months following litigation announcements range from no cost in the fifth month to 40 basis points in the second month. In contrast, investors benefit from exiting implicated funds in three out of the six months preceding litigation announcements. The results of the other four returns models are qualitatively similar.
Our results clearly indicate that, consistent with Coval and Stafford's (2007) argument that prices of underlying assets become depressed when there is a large volume of asset sales, investors who exit implicated funds before other investors do indeed avoid the lower returns suffered by those who exit after litigation announcements. As Table 4 shows, mutual funds face large outflows following litigation announcement and may thus suffer fire-sale costs when they try to liquidate their portfolios to satisfy the high redemption volume. These fire-sale costs would explain the lower returns observed following litigation announcements.
Panel B of Table 5 shows our assessment of whether investors benefit from exiting implicated funds prior to litigation announcements. Specifically, in the first rows of the five event windows (which range from one to five months), we list the differences between the accumulated coefficients of event-month indicators before and after litigation announcements. In the second rows, we report the F-statistics for the test in which the difference is equal to 0. For the one-month window, the difference in coefficients pre-and post-announcement ranges from 58 basis points to 64 basis points.
For the three-month window, the difference in accumulated coefficients pre-and post-announcement ranges from 65 basis points to 112 basis points. These differences are both economically and statistically significant.
This evidence for pre-event runs and return differences between pre-and postevent runs suggests that the timing of redemption matters for returns despite the pro-rata distribution of proceeds from asset sales in mutual funds, and that, if investors are to penalize management, it is rational for them to do so before the adverse information becomes public.
Cross-sectional difference in runs and returns
We also conduct fund-by-fund estimations of the cross-sectional differences in fund runs and returns before and after litigation announcements. Specifically, we add two indicators into the flow and returns models (Equations 2 to 7)-one for the six-month pre-event window and the other for the six-month post-event window-and estimate fund-by-fund the pre-and post-event runs and returns. We then summarize these fundlevel estimates and compare them across different fund groups. The results are given in Table 6 .
Panel A of Table 6 summarizes the coefficients estimates on the indicators of the six-month pre-and post-event runs, with the cross-sectional mean and t-statistics of the runs for all implicated funds listed in column 1. As the column shows, not only are the abnormal flows in both event windows significantly negative, which implies the existence of fund runs both before and after litigations, but post-event runs are larger than pre-event runs (-1.44% vs. -0.42%). The remaining columns present the differences in pre and post runs across groups. Funds without an SEC charge history experience significantly smaller pre-event runs than those with a charge history. Likewise, funds that belong to financial conglomerates experience significantly fewer runs both before and after litigations. Finally, post-event runs are significantly larger for funds with illiquid assets than for those with liquid assets. These results are consistent with our hypothesis on the effects of reputation and liquidity on fund runs.
In addition, as panel A of Table 6 shows, post-event runs are much smaller in large institutional funds than in retail funds. This finding is consistent with the argument put forward by James and Karceski (2006) that large institutions are more sophisticated monitors than retail investors and small institutions. Most particularly, they understand that share value is determined by the underlying assets, meaning that selling shares at the time of the fund's fire sale would impose losses.
Panel B of Table 6 provides a comparison of the coefficient estimates on the six months pre-and post-event indicators from the returns models; that is, the estimates of the return benefits of pre-event runs relative to those of post-event runs. The first column presents the return benefits for all implicated funds, while the remaining columns list the average return differences and t-statistics across groups. As is apparent, the risk-adjusted returns (alpha) are significantly higher in the pre-event window than in the post-event window, especially for retails funds, funds with illiquid assets, and funds with large postevent outflows. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that liquidity and the magnitude of runs affect the fire-sale costs associated with redemptions.
Not only can liquidity of underlying assets affect runs and return differences, so can fund reputation. In fact, fund reputation can also alleviate investors' suspicion of mismanagement and reduce runs, which in turn may decrease the probability of financial contagion. In Table 7 , therefore, we report the results of our panel approach, an augmented version of the flow model given in Equation (2), which is designed to determine whether fund reputation affects investor decisions to run and thus fund susceptibility. This augmented model interacts the dummy variables for fund characteristics with every term in the original equation. The first two columns in the table list the management's ownership type and the last two columns, its SEC charge record.
Both sets of regressions use cluster-robust variance-covariance estimators in which the clusters are funds, and each regression generates two sets of coefficients, one for standalone variables and the other for interaction terms.
The estimations clearly show that runs on implicated funds with conglomerate parents are less significant both prior to and post litigation filing, which implies that investors are less suspicious of abusive behavior by conglomerate-operated funds and punish them less even when abusive behavior is revealed. In fact, the absence of prelitigation runs suggests that conglomerates may be perceived as more reputable and hence less likely to engage in abusive trading practices. However, the absence of post-litigation runs may indicate that investors do not run conglomerates for abusive practices and/or they believe conglomerates to be better equipped to deal with the aftermath and financial consequences of litigation.
The results given in columns 5 and 6 of Table 7 also indicate that SEC charge history affects the timing of runs but not their size. That is, prior to litigations, investors are less suspicious of abusive practices in funds with no history of SEC investigations.
Reputation is lost, however, as soon as investors learn of abusive practices. Hence, even though in the eyes of the law, fund managements may be innocent until proven guilty, investors apparently presume guilt as soon as they learn of litigation.
Finally, we examine the effect of underlying asset liquidity on the return difference between withdrawals made prior to and post announcements. Because the benefit of pre-event runs is avoidance of the liquidation costs (price depression) borne by investors when revelation of an adverse event forces funds to sell assets, investors in funds with illiquid assets (e.g., REITs, international assets, or municipal funds) have stronger incentives to run because of potentially greater benefit.
To assess this effect, we apply a panel approach to the augmented version of the returns model described in Equations (3) through (7) We therefore test for differences in the accumulated coefficients of event-window indicators and their interactions with the liquid indicator. As shown in Table 8 , Panel A, in all specifications and event-windows, there are significant differences in returns between investors in illiquid funds who exit before the announcement and those who do so after it. As Panel B shows, however, the return differences between investors in liquid funds who exit pre and post announcement are less pronounced. These results therefore support the hypothesis that liquidation cost is higher in illiquid funds.
In sum, consistent with the argument on penalizing mismanagement and fire-sale costs, pre-event runs are more prominent in funds with bad reputations and illiquid assets.
That is, because investors are more likely to suspect irreputable funds, redemptions from such funds on public announcement of trading mispractices are larger. Likewise, because funds that invest in illiquid assets are more likely to suffer from fire-sale costs when they try to satisfy redemptions, the return differences before and after litigations are greater.
Evidence from holding data
Using fund holdings data, we illustrate fire-sale costs at the underlying asset level by comparing the CARs of stocks held by implicated with those held by non-implicated funds during September 2003. As Table 9 shows, stocks held by at least one implicated fund significantly underperform stocks not held by any implicated fund, with a onemonth CAR difference of 1.43% (-3.44% vs.-2.01%), significant at the 1% level. This pattern is consistent regardless of whether the aggregated mutual fund positions in the share are positive or negative.
We also show that the underperformance of firms held by implicated funds is driven mostly by those firms that are net-sold by implicated funds. In fact, as Table 10 illustrates, while firms that are sold by implicated funds significantly underperform firms bought by implicated funds in the aggregate, with a difference in one-month CAR of 2.57% (-3.74% vs.-1.17%), significant at the 1% level, this pattern does not appear for firms that are not held by implicated funds. Overall, the combined results from Table 9 and10 indicate that during September 2003, implicated funds underperformed mainly because of fire-sale costs when they liquidated their portfolios to satisfy redemptions.
Conclusion
This paper directly documents runs in mutual funds. We find not only that preevent runs start as early as six months prior to the announcement of litigations but that the size of pre-event runs is one-fourth that of post-event runs. The timing and size of runs are also affected by fund and investor characteristics such as reputation and liquidity of underlying assets. In addition, because concerted runs trigger fire sales that result in significant costs, investors who run funds prior to litigation announcements realize higher returns than those who run after, especially in less-liquid funds. These results suggest that the pro-rata distribution of proceeds from asset sales is not sufficient to prevent fund runs.
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